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Phenomenological Approaches to Psychiatric Classification 
Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Kent State University 
Abstract 
 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of phenomenological approaches to psychiatric 
classification. My aim is to encourage and facilitate philosophical debate over the best ways to 
classify psychiatric disorders. First, I articulate phenomenological critiques of the dominant 
approach to classification and diagnosis—i.e., the operational approach employed in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) and the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). Second, I describe the type or typification approach to 
psychiatric classification, which I distinguish into three different versions: ideal types, essential 
types, and prototypes. I argue that despite their occasional conflation in the contemporary 
literature, there are important distinctions among these approaches. Third, I outline a new 
phenomenological-dimensional approach. I show how this approach, which starts from basic 
dimensions of human existence, allows us to investigate the full range of psychopathological 
conditions without accepting the validity of current diagnostic categories. 
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Phenomenological Approaches to Psychiatric Classification 
Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Kent State University 
Introduction 
Today, the dominant systems of psychiatric classification are the 5th edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA, 2013) and the 10th edition of the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 2004)—which, in its forthcoming 11th 
edition, will largely converge with the DSM-5. Other systems include the Psychodynamic 
Diagnostic Manual (PDM-2; Lingiardi & McWilliams, 2017), which is informed by 
psychoanalytic approaches, and the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative, a dimensional 
approach developed by the US National Institute of Mental Health (Cuthbert, 2014; Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2013). The goal of any psychiatric classification should be to provide a means of 
organizing and navigating the complex domain of mental disorders, thereby guiding both clinical 
practice and scientific research. 
Most contemporary approaches aim for a biological classification. They assume that 
mental disorders are, at their basis, biological disease entities. The goal of classification is, 
therefore, to provide a set of categories that maps onto discrete biological diseases. However, in 
light of the DSM’s failure to biologically validate its categories of disorder, psychiatrists are now 
looking to alternative approaches that might produce new classifications. 
Some of these alternative approaches are grounded in phenomenology, a philosophical 
study of human experience and existence. Phenomenological psychopathologists describe not 
only “what it’s like” or “what it feels like” to live with a mental disorder, but also how the 
structural features of human experience and existence—e.g., intentionality, selfhood, 
temporality, and affectivity—alter in psychopathological cases. At this point, however, none of 
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these classificatory approaches have culminated in a classification scheme like the ones we find 
in the DSM, ICD, or PDM. Here, I refer to a classificatory approach as a process or method of 
classifying phenomena. In the case of mental disorders, classificatory approaches might track, 
for instance, differences in experience, behavior, neurobiology, or treatment response. I refer to a 
classification scheme as the set of phenomena that an approach has grouped or delineated. In the 
case of the DSM, for instance, the scheme is the set of categories included in the manual. 
Therefore, to say that phenomenologists have developed only classificatory approaches means 
that they have methods for delineating the range of psychopathological conditions, but they have 
not actually produced their own scheme. 
In addressing the topic of phenomenology and psychiatric classification, this chapter has 
two aims: First, it presents phenomenological critiques of the DSM/ICD approach to 
classification. Second, it delineates the various phenomenological approaches to classification. 
My intention is not to take a stand on the adequacy of any particular approach. Rather, my 
intention is to delineate the central features of these approaches side-by-side, and against the 
backdrop of the DSM/ICD, so that phenomenologists will be in a better position to debate these 
approaches and develop more effective systems of classification—e.g., systems that more 
accurately align with neurobiological markers, predict course of illness, or guide targeted 
therapeutic interventions. 
1 Phenomenological Critiques of Operationalism 
Since the DSM-III (APA, 1980), operationalism has been the dominant approach to classification 
and diagnosis. As employed in the DSM, an “operational approach” is one that categorizes and 
diagnoses disorders by reference to a set of easily observable symptoms, some number of which 
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must be present for a predefined period of time.1 Major depressive disorder (MDD), for example, 
is diagnosed when at least five of nine possible symptoms are present for at least two weeks. One 
of these symptoms must be either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure. The 
other symptoms include (3) significant weight loss or weight gain; (4) insomnia or hypersomnia; 
(5) psychomotor agitation or retardation; (6) fatigue or loss of energy; (7) feelings of 
worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt; (8) diminished ability to think or concentrate; 
and (9) recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation (APA, 2013). Schizophrenia, by contrast, 
is diagnosed when at least two of five symptoms are present over a one-month period: (1) 
delusions; (2) hallucinations; (3) disorganized speech; (4) grossly disorganized or catatonic 
behavior; and (5) negative symptoms; (in addition, at least one of the symptoms must be items 1, 
2, or 3) (APA, 2013).2 
 Notably, the DSM’s major focus has been on enhancing interrater reliability—that is, 
increasing the likelihood that two or more clinicians will diagnose the same patient with the 
same condition. An operational approach, with its reliance on easily observable symptoms and 
structured diagnostic interviews provides an effective means of enhancing reliability. But 
psychiatrists want more than reliability—they want validity. In most cases, this takes the form of 
an appeal to neurobiological underpinnings. However, as Assen Jablensky and Robert Kendell 
                                                 
1 In contemporary psychiatry, what goes under the label of “operationalism” is relatively 
superficial when compared with its early philosophical and scientific development in the work of 
Carl Hempel (1966), Edwin Boring (1945), and Percy Williams Bridgman (1938). While 
psychiatry’s version of operationalism likely has its roots in this history, one should not assume 
that it takes over the fairly robust philosophical programs of these early figures. For a more 
detailed account of the history of operationalism in psychology and psychiatry, see Hasok Chang 
(2009) and Josef Parnas and Pierre Bovet (2015). 
2 Each diagnostic category includes additional criteria, such as significant impairment of one’s 
ability to work, engage in self-care, or maintain social relations.  
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point out, there are numerous definitions of validity in psychiatry, with little agreement on which 
sense of validity should be privileged. A category might be considered valid if it 
(a) is based on a coherent, explicit set of defining features (construct validity); (b) has 
empirical referents, such as verifiable observations for establishing its presence (content 
validity); (c) can be corroborated by independent procedures such as biological or 
psychological tests (concurrent validity); and (d) predicts future course of illness or 
treatment response (predictive validity). (Jablensky & Kendell, 2002, p. 10) 
 
In light of this state of affairs, some psychiatrists—including Jablensky and Kendell—argue that 
we should appeal to a concept of utility instead of validity. Utility is achieved when a category or 
scheme “provides nontrivial information about prognosis and likely treatment outcomes, and/or 
testable propositions about biological and social correlates” (Kendell & Jablensky, 2003, p. 9). 
Considering the DSM’s shortcomings with respect to validity and utility, it has been the subject 
of widespread criticism from groups both inside and outside of mainstream psychiatry. 
 Phenomenological psychopathologists constitute one of these critical groups. 
Phenomenologists don’t necessarily agree on how to approach the problem of validity or 
utility—some seem to endorse, for example, the view that phenomenology should assist in the 
process of distinguishing biological disease entities, whereas others defend a less naturalistic 
view. There are, however, three general criticisms of the DSM’s operational approach that we 
find in the phenomenological literature: 
1) It ignores how clinicians intuitively diagnose patients.  
2) It neglects the organization among the various symptoms, treating them as disparate parts 
without a unified whole.  
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3) It allows categories to reify, inhibiting future refinement and revision of the classification 
scheme.3 (Parnas & Bovet, 2015; Schwartz & Wiggins, 1987a, 1987b) 
In general, phenomenological approaches to psychiatric classification claim to resolve all of 
these issues. In what follows, I outline four phenomenological approaches to classification, 
which I divide into two broad classes: type and dimension approaches. The first class includes 
ideal types, essential types, and prototypes. The second class includes a dimensional approach 
that I have recently proposed, which draws inspiration from the National Institute of Mental 
Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative. 
 
2 Typification and Classification 
Before distinguishing the ideal type, essential type, and prototype approaches, it will be helpful 
to outline what they hold in common. All of these approaches aim to resolve the above 
shortcomings of the DSM’s operational approach, and they do so in the following ways: 
1) They take stock of how clinicians intuitively understand their patients—utilizing, rather 
than ignoring, this intuitive understanding. 
2) They seek an organizing principle, a gestalt, or what Eugene Minkowski calls the trouble 
générateur, that makes sense of the total structure of the disorder. 
3) They build in mechanisms for continued revision and refinement, treating current 
concepts as one step along the way to a better system of classification. 
With respect to the first solution, all three approaches share the basic phenomenological insight 
that we perceive and make sense of our world through tacit types or categories. In everyday 
                                                 
3 This situation is even more problematic when a diagnostic category encompasses a 
heterogeneity of conditions, as we find in the case of MDD (see, e.g., Ratcliffe, Broome, Smith, 
& Bowden, 2013) 
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experience, these types are not explicitly defined and their boundaries are not always clear. 
Whenever we perceive something, we perceive it as some particular kind of thing; we never 
perceive a bare object. For example, if I walk through my garden and see that a rose has 
bloomed, I simply see it as a rose. In most cases, I don’t list off explicit criteria to check whether 
it’s a rose. I just know what a rose looks like. 
But this doesn’t mean that our typifications are never wrong. Perhaps I invite my friend, a 
botanist, over to show her my rose. Upon walking into the garden, she exclaims, “That’s not a 
rose! It’s a peony.” Realizing that my initial typification was incorrect, I’m now open to being 
corrected by my friend. When she corrects me, she might teach me explicit criteria for 
distinguishing roses from peonies. And I might rely on these explicit criteria for some time. But, 
eventually, this too will become habitual and tacit. I’ll develop my own expertise, immediately 
seeing a flower as a rose, a peony, or some other species. 
Our typifications are, therefore, learned and refined in the course of everyday experience. 
I wasn’t born knowing how to identify flowers; I learned what counted as a flower and how to 
distinguish among different kinds of flowers through everyday experience (and with a little 
guidance from my parents). And, even now, my ability to tacitly typify or categorize flowers 
remains relatively limited. The botanist is not only better at distinguishing peonies from roses; 
she can also distinguish among a wide variety of peonies and roses. And, as an expert, she can 
distinguish them intuitively, without appealing to explicit criteria. In this respect, to refer to the 
process of typification as intuitive simply means that it occurs tacitly or implicitly—not that it’s 
based on an innate or unchanging base of knowledge.  
 Moreover, seeing as isn’t simply a process of identifying and categorizing objects within 
the world. In addition to identifying and categorizing, I also have an immediate sense of how to 
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take things up and put them to use. For example, when I see an object on my table as a mug, it 
immediately shows up to me as a vessel for holding tea, coffee, or hot chocolate. It also shows 
up to me as something I should wash in the kitchen sink or place in the dishwasher. In general, 
these actions aren’t things that I have to explicitly reflect on or infer. To see an object as a mug 
just is to see it as something that can perform these functions and should be handled in these 
ways.  
 Phenomenologists argue that we employ tacit typifications not only in our experience of 
everyday objects, but also in our experience of other people. To navigate the social world, we 
typify people in a variety of ways and these typifications guide our initial interactions. When I 
walk into my classroom, I immediately perceive the people before me as my students and they 
perceive me as their professor. These tacit typifications shape how we engage each other, 
determining proper modes of address, expected behaviors, and so on. Such typifications can, of 
course, be pernicious: They might, for instance, become racial or gender stereotypes. However, 
phenomenologists argue that prejudices aren’t inherently problematic (see, e.g., Gadamer, 
1960/2013, 2008). We need presuppositions and assumptions in order to successfully navigate 
our environment (although we also need to be open to revising them in light of future 
experiences). 
But what does everyday typification have to do with the practice of clinical psychology 
and psychiatry? Proponents of typification argue that clinicians have an intuitive understanding 
of their patients, and that this understanding often leads to an initial diagnosis (Schwartz & 
Wiggins, 1987b). In the clinical encounter, the skilled clinician doesn’t simply perceive a generic 
person who happens to exhibit an array of symptoms. Her perception often includes a tacit sense 
of her patient as depressed, as schizophrenic, as autistic, and so on. This initial perception can 
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guide her process of questioning, helping her arrive at a final diagnosis. The operational, check-
list diagnostic method of the DSM-5 ignores this skilled, intuitive mode of understanding and 
therefore fails to put it to use. 
Over the past few decades, intuitive diagnosis has been overshadowed by the operational 
approach. However, there has been a recent renewal in studies of the effectiveness and accuracy 
of intuitive modes of diagnosis, focusing both on the diagnosis of schizophrenia (Gozé et al., 
2018) and on the ability to identity those at risk of developing schizophrenia (Lindau et al., n.d.). 
These studies stress that the intuitive approach provides only a preliminary or tentative diagnosis. 
An expert psychiatrist should be guided by his typifications, but should not simply allow his 
initial intuition to determine the final diagnosis. Marcin Moskalewicz, Michael Schwartz, and 
Tudi Gozé (2018) argue that intuitive diagnosis, properly conducted, is not simply an immediate 
sense of the patient’s condition. Rather, it is a temporally extended process in which the 
psychiatrist critically reflects upon his intuition or typification and seeks out disconfirming 
evidence. Moreover, they claim that this mode of diagnosis need not conflict with an operational 
approach. One might, for instance, be led to an initial diagnostic category through intuition, but 
confirm or disconfirm this intuition by employing operational criteria. 
 This practice of actively confirming or disconfirming an intuitive diagnosis is linked with 
the practice of revising and refining diagnostic categories themselves. This latter practice is as an 
attempt to make the diagnostic system more rigorous and scientific. We need to guarantee that 
our types accurately identify the conditions they’re meant to diagnose and that these types don’t 
reify into outdated and inaccurate categories. However, the three typification approaches do not 
necessarily agree on how we should make diagnosis scientific. Each proposes a slightly different 
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method of harnessing everyday typifications, transforming them into scientific concepts and 
categories (Fernandez, 2016). 
 These approaches are not, however, properly disambiguated in the literature. The 
essential type and prototype approaches, for instance, are sometimes presented as if they don’t 
differ in any important respects from the ideal type approach. To head off potential confusions, I 
describe each approach below by focusing on their distinctive features, illustrating how each 
proposes a different way of making typifications scientific—and, ultimately, a different way of 
classifying mental disorders. 
 
2.1 Ideal Types 
The ideal type approach is championed by Schwartz and Osborne Wiggins. In the fields of 
psychology and psychiatry, this approach is rooted in Karl Jaspers’ General Psychopathology 
(1913/1997). But Jaspers himself adapted it from Max Weber’s initial proposal. Weber, the 
founder of modern sociology, argued that social phenomena could not be classified in the same 
manner as natural objects. The sociologist cannot create a classification akin to the periodic table 
of elements because social phenomena do not have hard boundaries—their manifestations are 
fluid and variable. To better capture the features of social phenomena, Weber developed the 
notion of an ideal type. As he defines it, 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and 
by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally 
absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-
sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its 
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conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically 
anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. (Weber, 1949, p. 90) 
What is most important here—at least with respect to differentiating the phenomenological 
approaches to classification—is that the ideal type is not an empirical reality. It is ideal in the 
sense of being pure, uncontaminated by the messy details of the concrete world (Broome, 2006). 
 But what makes ideal types scientific? As Schwartz and Wiggins explain, ideal types are 
heuristic devices. They provide the community of researchers and clinicians with a means of 
conceptually organizing their subject matter. As heuristic devices, ideal types aren’t taken as 
“true”—i.e., they aren’t judged with respect to how accurately they represent some aspect of 
reality. Rather, by characterizing her concept as an ideal type, the researcher or clinician admits 
that no instance of the disorder in question will correspond exactly with her concept; the concrete 
manifestation might lack certain features included in the ideal type, or express additional features 
not included in the ideal type (Schwartz & Wiggins, 1987a, p. 283). And, as Schwartz and 
Wiggins argue, this lack of perfect fit enhances the scientific value of ideal types; the precise 
ways in which the concrete instance of the disorder fails to correspond with the ideal type can 
guide the processes of both clinical diagnosis and scientific research. 
The clinician’s goal—as Schwartz and Wiggins present it—is to understand the patient in 
his particularity. Therefore, the ways in which the patient diverges from the ideal type can guide 
further inquiry into the unique nature of his individual condition. One of the researcher’s goals, 
by contrast, is to produce a naturalistic or biological classification.4 In this case, the ideal type 
                                                 
4 Among phenomenologists, it’s by no means universally accepted that a biological classification 
should be our ultimate goal. However, in at least some of Schwartz and Wiggins’ presentations 
of their program, the ideal type approach is characterized as a step along the way to a biological 
classification. 
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provides a shared starting point for constructing hypotheses and carrying out experiments. As 
Schwartz and Wiggins explain,  
For psychiatric research, ideal types furnish the initial conceptual guidelines for the 
postulation of law-like regularities and the design of experiments to test such postulates. 
For clinical practice, ideal types predelineate the features of disorders so that clinicians 
know what to search for, focus on, and examine in particular patients. (Schwartz & 
Wiggins, 1987a, p. 286) 
Because ideal types are heuristic devices, their value is based entirely on their utility. If the 
community of researchers and clinicians finds that altering the ideal type (or replacing it 
altogether) better guides their research and clinical practice, then they are free to make such 
alterations or replacements. In this respect, the set of ideal types used to delineate the field of 
mental disorders is not taken as a definitive system of classification. It is one step along the 
way.5 
 
2.2 Essential Types 
The essential type approach was proposed by Josef Parnas and Dan Zahavi (2002) (although they 
do not call it by this name). Parnas and Zahavi ground their approach in Husserlian 
phenomenology: “a tradition specifically aiming at grasping the essential structures of human 
experience and existence” (2002, p. 143). However, there is an ambiguity in their adaptation of 
this approach to the study of mental disorders. They initially characterize their phenomenological 
                                                 
5 This characterization is, notably, in contrast with Weber’s initial employment of ideal types. 
Weber’s goal was not to use ideal types as a step toward a naturalistic conceptualization of social 
phenomena. Rather, he thought that social phenomena were best classified through ideal types. 
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approach to psychiatric diagnosis and classification as if it is identical with Schwartz and 
Wiggins’ approach: 
A concept of “ideal type” or “essence” plays here an important role. Ideal type 
exemplifies the ideal and necessary connections between its composing features. Ideal 
type transcends what is given in experience: e.g. all my possible drawings of a straight 
line will be somehow deficient (for instance if examined through a microscope) 
compared to the very (ideal) concept of a straight line. (Parnas & Zahavi, 2002, p. 157). 
Here, Parnas and Zahavi appeal directly to Schwartz and Wiggins’ (1987a) ideal types. But their 
further characterizations seem to present a substantially different project; as Matthew Broome 
has pointed out, Parnas and Zahavi seem to conflate Weberian ideal types with Husserlian 
essences (Broome, 2006, p. 311). 
If we look further into how Parnas and Zahavi characterize their approach, we find a key 
distinction between ideal types and essential types, which hinges on their relation to necessity. 
According to Parnas and Zahavi, the “[p]henomenological approach to anomalous experience is 
precisely concerned with bringing forth the typical, and ideally necessary features of such 
experience” (2002, p. 157; my emphasis). As they explain, their approach identifies essential 
features of categories of mental disorder, rather than just essential features of human experience 
as such. In order to discover these essential features, they suggest that that we employ Husserl’s 
eidetic reduction, which involves a process of imaginative variation:  
This process of imaginative variation will lead us to certain borders that cannot be varied, 
i.e. changed and transgressed, without making the phenomenon cease to be the kind of 
phenomenon it is. The variation consequently allows us to distinguish between the 
accidental properties, i.e. the properties that could have been different, and the essential 
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properties, i.e. the invariant structures that make the phenomenon be of the type it is. 
(Parnas & Zahavi, 2002, p. 157) 
On this approach, a condition that fails to display an essential feature simply won’t count as the 
disorder in question. Parnas and Zahavi’s emphasis on essential features will, therefore, produce 
more rigid categories than Schwartz and Wiggins’ ideal types because ideal types do not identify 
necessary features of disorders; they are heuristic devices with no truth value. But this is not to 
suggest that Parnas and Zahavi’s categories will not be amenable to revision and refinement. As 
they explain, to claim that something is an essential feature of a disorder is not to claim that this 
has been proved once and for all. It’s possible that one was mistaken in labeling a feature 
“essential” Future phenomenological analyses might provide reason to believe that the feature is 
contingent or accidental (even if common or typical) (Parnas & Zahavi, 2002, p. 157). 
 
2.3 Prototypes 
The prototype approach, like ideal type and essential type approaches, is intended to 
make the everyday process of typification scientific. Parnas and Shaun Gallagher (2015) propose 
prototypes as an alternative to operational classification and diagnosis. According to Parnas and 
Gallagher, “A prototype is a central example of a category in question (a sparrow is more 
characteristic of the category “bird” than is a penguin or an ostrich), with a graded dilution of 
typicality toward the borders of the category, where it eventually overlaps exemplars from 
neighboring categories” (2015, p. 73; my emphasis). As they characterize it here, a prototype is 
neither a utopic ideal nor a clearly defined essence. Unlike an ideal type, a prototype is a 
concrete exemplar of the disorder, which necessarily implies that such an exemplar actually 
exists. And, unlike an essential type, a prototype does not establish a set of necessary and 
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essential features of the condition in question. Rather, the prototype is itself a concrete instance 
of the condition. Other conditions are categorized based on how closely they match this 
particular instance. 
Moreover, Parnas and Gallagher characterize their particular version of prototypes as a 
“prototype-gestalt,” which highlights the unity and organization of symptoms. However, an 
apparent contradiction arises in their characterization of the gestalt. They say, “A gestalt 
instantiates a certain generality of type. Yet, this type-generality is always deformed, because it 
inheres in a particular, concrete and situated individual. The particular token always attenuates 
the ideal clarity and pregnancy of type” (2015, p. 75). By suggesting that there is no perfect, 
concrete instance of the condition, Parnas and Gallagher characterize their approach as if it’s 
akin to Schwartz and Wiggins’ ideal types—and they refer directly to Schwartz and Wiggins’ 
work on the topic (1987a, 1987b). But this seems to contradict their initial characterization: They 
initially argued that—on their prototype approach—categories are defined, or anchored, by 
appealing to a concrete exemplar. But if the prototype or exemplar is an imperfect instantiation 
of its category—as they suggest in their second characterization—then it can’t be what’s 
anchoring the category; the prototype does not stand, as it were, in the center of the category. 
Parnas and Gallagher seem to appeal to an ideal category with respect to which the prototype 
itself is judged as adequate or inadequate. 
I don’t mean to suggest that this apparent contradiction is necessarily unresolvable. There 
might be some manner of reconciling these two approaches: For example, the prototype might be 
a useful diagnostic or teaching tool, while the ideal type is what the psychiatrist ultimately 
appeals to when revising his classificatory scheme. However, Parnas and Gallagher don’t seem 
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to acknowledge the apparent contradiction in the first place, and therefore offer no resolution of 
their own.6 
In addition to this ambiguity, another confusion arises when we consider Schwartz, 
Wiggins, and Michael Norko’s (1989, 1995) early work on the relationship between ideal types 
and prototypes. However, I believe this confusion can be avoided once we understand that their 
critique of prototypes does not apply to the version presented by Parnas and Gallagher. Schwartz, 
Wiggins, and Norko suggest that prototypes have two major shortcomings: First, prototypes 
consist of a set of attributes without conceptual unity; Jaspers, for example, says that a prototype 
is “a disjointed enumeration” of features (Schwartz et al., 1989, p. 6). Second, prototypes cannot 
produce novel concepts because they are constructed by surveying psychiatrists about how they 
diagnose and understand their patients—prototypes merely reflect the current understanding of 
mental disorders (1989, p. 6). However, from the above account, it should be clear that neither of 
these critiques apply to Parnas and Gallagher’s prototype approach. Despite the ambiguities in 
their approach, they clearly posit a gestalt organization among the prototype’s features and they 
do not believe that prototypes are constructed by merely surveying and averaging typical ways of 
understanding mental disorders. 
 
                                                 
6 These ambiguities are compounded by Parnas and Gallagher’s apparent use of “prototype” and 
“exemplar” as synonyms. In their initial characterization of their prototype approach, they appeal 
to Edouard Machery’s work on concept formation. But Machery clearly distinguishes between 
“prototype” and “exemplar” approaches to concept formation. As he describes it, “a prototype of 
a class is a body of statistical knowledge about the properties deemed to be possessed by 
members of this class” (Machery, 2009, p. 83). An exemplar, by contrast, “is a body of 
knowledge about the properties believed to be possessed by a particular member of a class” 
(Machery, 2009, p. 93). In light of this, it seems that Parnas and Gallagher’s proposal is akin to 
an “exemplar” approach, which therefore diverges substantially from what’s often called a 
“prototype” approach. 
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3 Dimensions 
Until recently, all phenomenological approaches to classification and diagnosis have been type 
approaches. However, I have proposed a phenomenological-dimensional approach to psychiatric 
research and classification (Fernandez, forthcoming).7 The primary motivation behind this 
approach is psychiatry’s recent shift from categorial approaches to dimensional approaches. By 
“dimensional,” I do not refer to the DSM-5’s construction of new, graded categories, such as 
autism spectrum disorder. Rather, I refer to approaches that dispense with categories altogether, 
beginning, instead, from basic aspects of human experience or behavior. If psychiatry continues 
in this direction—which seems likely—then the gulf between phenomenology’s categorial 
approach and mainstream psychiatry will only widen. In light of this, I’ve suggested that 
phenomenologists embrace a broadly dimensional approach, thereby reducing barriers to 
interdisciplinary collaboration between phenomenologists and psychiatrists. 
Psychiatry’s major dimensional approach is the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) 
initiative developed by the US National Institute of Mental Health. The RDoC aims to produce a 
new research classification (i.e., one not currently intended for use in clinical practice) based on 
dimensions or constructs (the terms are used interchangeably) of human experience and 
behavior. Constructs are clustered into broad domains, such as Cognitive Systems or Social 
Processes. The Social Processes domain includes, for example, the constructs of Affiliation and 
Attachment, Social Communication, Perception and Understanding of Self, and Perception and 
Understanding of Others. Some of these constructs are then divided into subconstructs. For 
example, Perception and Understanding of Self includes the subconstructs of Agency and Self-
                                                 
7 Thomas Fuchs and Mauro Pallagrosi have also proposed the use of a dimensional approach for 
the study of psychopathological temporality (Fuchs & Pallagrosi, 2018). 
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Knowledge. By orienting research through this matrix, researchers achieve two ends: First, they 
can investigate psychopathological conditions without framing their investigations through the 
lens of invalid DSM categories. Second, they can study how this dimension manifests across 
both normal and abnormal conditions; they might study, for instance, how agency manifests 
across subjects who would typically be diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, and 
schizophrenia. 
How can we develop a dimensional approach for use in phenomenology? While a 
broadly dimensional approach might draw inspiration from the RDoC, it need not conform with 
the RDoC matrix (i.e., its set of domains, constructs, and subconstructs). I have argued that a 
phenomenological matrix of domains and dimensions can be drawn from what Heidegger calls 
“existentials,” and other phenomenologists refer to as “transcendental,” “essential,” or 
“ontological” structures (Fernandez, 2017, forthcoming). Each existential is a basic feature of 
human existence, such as intentionality, selfhood, affectivity, or temporality. These existentials 
constitute the basic domains of phenomenological psychopathology, with each existential further 
distinguished into its various structural moments, or features, which constitute its dimensions. 
The domain (or existential) of Selfhood, for instance, can include the dimensions of Core Self 
and Narrative Self, with each dimension further subdivided or specified as required. The Core 
Self might include features such as (1) Cognition and Stream of Consciousness; (2) Self-
Awareness and Presence; (3) Bodily Experience; and (4) Demarcation/Transitivism of the self-
world boundary (see Parnas et al., 2005).8 We can then investigate each of these domains, 
                                                 
8 These items are adapted from the Examination of Anomalous Self Experience (EASE) (Parnas 
et al., 2005). As I’ve argued elsewhere, the EASE does not translate directly into the kind of 
dimensional approach I am proposing, but some of its items can be appropriated for dimensional 
analysis (Fernandez, forthcoming).  
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constructs, and subconstructs across the full range of normal and abnormal experience, moving 
beyond current diagnostic categories.9 
My phenomenological-dimensional approach is—at this time—only a proposal. 
However, some phenomenologists have already conducted studies with a broadly dimensional 
outlook. I briefly outline two of these studies here with the intention of providing some insight 
into what a phenomenological-dimensional approach might look like in practice. First, I outline 
Louis Sass and Elizabeth Pienkos’ comparative study of selfhood across melancholia, bipolar 
mania, and schizophrenia. Second, I outline Matthew Ratcliffe’s study of temporal disturbances 
in depressive disorders. While these authors don’t explicitly characterize their work as 
dimensional in the sense I’ve described here, these studies investigate how basic existential 
structures alter across psychopathological conditions; they’re framed through what I’ve called 
the basic domains and dimensions of human existence, rather than through current diagnostic 
categories. 
Sass and Pienkos study how one dimension of experience—the core self—alters across 
three categories of disorder. One feature of the core self that they explore is the experience of the 
self-world boundary, or the way in which I experience myself and my identity in relation with 
my environment. As they argue, in melancholia the boundary between self and world is 
enhanced or increased; the world feels distant or unreachable. In mania, by contrast, the 
boundary between self and world is significantly diminished, sometimes culminating in an 
experience of mystic union (Sass & Pienkos, 2013, p. 124). We might assume that this manic 
experience is akin to schizophrenia, which also involves a diminished self-world boundary. 
                                                 
9 For a more complete account of a phenomenological-dimensional approach, including 
illustrative examples, see Fernandez (forthcoming). 
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However, Sass and Pienkos argue that this apparent similarity is superficial. If we carefully 
attend to the way this dimension of experience can change, we’ll find that there are important 
differences in the experience of the self-world boundary between mania and schizophrenia. The 
experiences differ in two key respects: First, in mania the diminished self-world boundary is 
typically accompanied by a positive or neutral mood, whereas in schizophrenia it is typically 
accompanied by feelings of anxiety in which the subject feels invaded by the external world. 
Second, in mania there is often a sense of oneness with the world, whereas schizophrenia can 
include a sense of solipsism (the world is produced by my mind and has no independent reality). 
While Sass and Pienkos’ study still refers to current diagnostic categories, the categories 
don’t frame their investigation. Rather, their investigation is framed through the dimension of 
selfhood, which allows them to test and further articulate categorial boundaries. Such an 
investigation would be impossible if a study were confined to a particular category or had to 
assume the validity of current diagnostic categories from the start. Moreover, this suggests that 
dimensional and categorial approaches need not be mutually exclusive. A dimensional approach 
might help us refine clinical diagnostic categories. 
Another broadly dimensional approach is employed in Matthew Ratcliffe’s study of 
temporal disturbances in depressive disorders. Instead of comparing different diagnostic 
categories, Ratcliffe uses a dimensional analysis to assess the alleged homogeneity of depressive 
disorders. By showing that people diagnosed with depression report a variety of temporal 
disturbances, he casts doubt on the belief that we’ve identified a single, unified condition, and 
motivates the project of reclassifying depressive disorders. 
Many people with depression report changes in their temporal experience, such as the 
sense of time slowing down or stretching out (similar to the temporal experience of boredom). 
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Ratcliffe, however, argues that if we attend more carefully to descriptions of temporal experience 
in depressive episodes, we’ll find a wide variety of temporal disturbances expressed across these 
reports. Ratcliffe clusters these disturbances into three groups: loss of significane, loss of 
conative drive, and loss of life projects (Ratcliffe, 2012). First, some people report that future 
possibilities are not enticing or worth pursuing. Among this group, some report that future 
possibilities are insignificant as such—i.e., future possibilities are experienced as having no 
significance for anyone. Others report that possibilities are insignificant for themselves but 
understand that others might experience them as significant. Second, some people report that 
future possibilities are significant and worth pursuing, yet they lack any drive or motivation to 
pursue them. Third, some people report that future possibilities don’t show up at all; they have 
no sense of who they might be in the future. This is often accompanied by a sense that one will 
never escape their depression (Ratcliffe, 2012, p. 121; see also Aho, 2013; Fernandez, 2014; 
Maiese, 2017). Any of these disturbances might be experienced independently of the others, but 
there are also cases in which multiple disturbances occur simultaneously. 
Ratcliffe concludes that the diversity of temporal disturbances across people diagnosed 
with depressive disorders—specifically, with major depressive disorder—suggests that we might 
not be dealing with one homogeneous condition. There might be a heterogeneity of conditions 
that, due to imprecise diagnostic criteria, are classed as a single category of disorder. As Ratcliffe 
says, 
I have suggested that “depression” and more specific subcategories of depression such as 
“major depression” encompass a range of subtly different changes in the structure of 
temporal experience. I have not attempted to provide a comprehensive taxonomy here. 
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However, I have offered the beginnings of an interpretive framework for doing so and 
explored at least some of the variety. (Ratcliffe, 2012, p. 134) 
While Ratcliffe doesn’t provide a new classification scheme of depressive disorders, he does 
provide some tools that might help us construct a new scheme. These examples suggest that a 
dimensional approach can undermine the validity of current diagnostic categories, motivate the 
need for a new classification, and provide new conceptual distinctions that can be used to 
reclassify psychopathological conditions. 
While I believe there are good reasons for phenomenologists to move toward a 
dimensional approach, I want to suggest that this new approach might be compatible with type 
approaches. Type approaches seek the basic organizing principle of the disorder in question—the 
trouble générateur or core gestalt (Parnas, 2012). They aim not only to understand the 
relationship between parts and whole, but also to identify the core disturbance from which the 
various symptoms arise. In the case of schizophrenia, for instance, many phenomenologists have 
argued that the variety of symptoms can be tied to a core disturbance in the structure of selfhood; 
once we understand how selfhood has altered in schizophrenia, we can make sense of a variety if 
experiences, such as hallucinations as well as delusions of thought insertion and alien control. 
These experiences arise because of a breakdown in the sense of agency and ownership of one’s 
thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. A dimensional approach, with its focus on identifying and 
articulating alterations in specific domains and dimensions of human existence, provides a 
method of identifying these core disturbances. If such an approach is viable, then 
phenomenology’s type and dimension approaches will not only coexist, but can be mutually 
complementary (Fernandez, forthcoming).  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have provided an overview of phenomenological approaches to psychiatric 
classification. First, I articulated phenomenological critiques of the operational approach: (1) It 
ignores how clinicians intuitively diagnose patients, (2) it neglects the organization among the 
various symptoms, and (3) it allows categories to reify. Second, I described three different type 
or typification approaches to psychiatric classification—ideal types, essential types, and 
prototypes—and showed how these approaches differ (despite their occasional conflation in the 
contemporary literature). Third, I outlined a phenomenological-dimensional approach to 
psychiatric classification, which starts from existentials, or basic domains of human existence, 
rather than current diagnostic categories. 
 My intention, however, was not to argue for the superiority of the dimensional approach 
over type approaches. Rather, the primary aim of this chapter is to encourage and facilitate 
philosophical debate over the best ways to classify psychiatric disorders. Phenomenology has the 
potential to make substantial contributions to the project of psychiatric classification. But it’s 
internal ambiguities and inconsistences will need to be resolved before phenomenologists can 
move forward with a classification scheme of their own. This overview of the field should 
provide a useful starting point for future dialogue and debate.  
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